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Awkward States and Regional Organisations: 
The UK and Australia Compared 
 
INTRODUCTION – COMPARING AWKWARD PARTNERS IN REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION1 
 
Since the late 1980s, the comparative study of regional integration has 
undergone a renaissance. Originally undertaken largely outside EU studies, 
or with the EU and its academic literature constructed as an Other by scholars 
of the ‘new regionalism’, a recent rapprochement has generated the grounds 
for cross-fertilisation and a shared research agenda in which both sets of 
scholars are considered capable of contributing to an ongoing process of 
research (Acharya and Johnston 2008; Murray 2010a; Warleigh-Lack and 
Rosamond 2010; Robinson and Warleigh-Lack 2011).  
 This cooperation does not expect regions to be fully comparable with 
each other across every factor, variable or time period (Warleigh-Lack and 
Van Langenhove 2010). However, it suggests that situations previously 
considered unique, and perhaps intractable, if considered through the lens of 
an area specialism may now appear more capable of solution, or at least more 
capable of consideration from a fresh perspective, as the fruit of comparative 
study; beyond methodological nationalism, there may lie many new and 
fruitful comparisons of states and other actors, as they grapple with the 
challenges of globalisation, power shifts and the transnationalising world 
order (Slaughter 2004; Haynes 2005). In other words, if globalisation impacts 
structurally upon the unit of analysis of comparative politics scholars - nation 
states – then such scholars and those of international relations scholars can 
and should enter into fruitful dialogue.2 
 One such comparison is the role of the UK and Australia in their 
respective contexts of regional integration. This may appear counter-intuitive: 
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there are vast differences between the UK and Australia in terms of 
geography, economic linkages, and the place and role of each in its separate 
regional processes. Although the UK has traditionally shied away from 
articulating visions for the EU’s future, Australia has not been reluctant to 
make proposals and seek to be a leader in Asia Pacific plans – such as APEC 
(the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process) and Kevin Rudd’s 2008 
proposal for an Asia Pacific Community. Australia, unlike the UK, seeks to be 
a regional leader, but faces problems in being accepted as such. The UK is a 
member state of a group of 27 countries with common goals and objectives, 
despite many crises and problems. Australia is an outsider or outlier in its 
region. It confronts the fact that in many ways the Asian region is a ‘special’ 
case – it is highly diverse in terms of religion, statehood, nation-state 
development, economic development, and the institutional development of 
individual governance structures. Regional interactions in Asia are 
characterised by a desire for normative consensus and a respect for the 
integrity of the nation-state. Nationalism remains an important principle of 
the nation-states of Asia, albeit in different manifestations. Most importantly, 
democratic norms form the backbone of the Australian polity but this is not 
the case for most of its neighbours in the region. Moreover, the European 
Union (EU), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and APEC 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) processes occupy rather different places 
on the scale of region-ness (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000).3  
 Based on above differences one may legitimately question the 
comparability between these two cases. However, to dismiss it outright 
would be unwarranted. Probing into the comparison in some depth we found 
many commonalities, such as the problem of regional belonging as perceived 
by other partners, the various forms of awkwardness, and causal 
mechanisms. The issues confronted by the two states, both of which can be 
considered in International Relations terms as middle powers, in becoming 
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fully part of their respective regions are actually strikingly similar. Both can 
seek to play a leading role regionally, especially with regard to particular 
policy areas or the economy, but are often considered outside the mainstream, 
and thus with no sustained leadership capacity, by other states in their 
respective regions. Furthermore, Australia and the UK both use the 
‘Westminster model’ of liberal democracy, a further commonality which sets 
them apart from most if not all their regional respective partners,  which 
adopt either other forms of liberal democracy or, in the case of Australia’s 
region, in which non-democratic governments may hold power. Additionally, 
both Australia and the UK have a significant security relationship with an 
extra-regional superpower, namely the US, which problematises their 
relations within their respective regions.The awkwardness problem of the UK 
and Australia, in fact, is a common challenge in the process of regionalism. 
Japan, the US, China, France, and even Mexico have all experienced some 
form of awkwardness. A comparative study of the UK and Australia will 
encourage further study of other awkward states and demonstrates that the 
so-called “uniqueness” of a country  as an awkward partner, such as the UK 
or Australia, is in fact a nearly “universal” phenomenon in regional 
integration.  
The article aims to assess and compare the ways in which the two 
states are ‘awkward partners’ in their respective regions, seeking to draw on 
the secondary literature to facilitate comparison and to generate hypotheses 
about how the states might contribute to, experience, and overcome their 
awkwardness, which will be explored in subsequent empirical work.  
To carry out the comparison, we draw on the work of Katzenstein and 
Shiraishi (1997, 7–11, 23–31), who examine the role of international power, 
norms, and domestic state structures. We focus on how both material and 
ideational factors contribute to the awkwardness of the two states. As 
material factors, we count power relations, institutional and policy 
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preferences, economic objectives and preferences, security concerns, and 
domestic politics; as ideational factors, we count identity and vision. For us, 
‘identity’ refers to whether or not the UK and Australia consider themselves 
to be fully part of their region and ‘vision’ refers to how Australia and the UK 
would like their respective regions to develop.   
Through this comparison we argue that the UK and Australia are 
comparable as ‘awkward partners’ in their respective regions despite the 
existence of significant differences between them.  
We further claim that the UK and Australia’s status as ‘awkward 
partners’ is produced by the interplay of a mix of material and ideational 
conditions. While awkwardness is ultimately a social condition that is a 
function of the perceptions, judgement, and recognition of partners and the 
actors themselves, it is produced by the interaction of various factors that 
stem from both material and ideational origins. Through comparison we find 
that while other factors also play a role, power relations, domestic politics and 
cultural identity are the most important factors. It is the interaction of these 
three factors that produces the awkwardness, with the same causal 
mechanism in both the UK and Australia.   
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we focus on 
the UK as an ‘awkward partner’ in European integration. In section three, we 
do the same regarding Australia and its region. In section four, we compare 
and assess the findings, and also generate hypotheses regarding 
awkwardness as a feature of regional integration. 
  
AWKWARD ALBION  
 
The UK is generally considered the paradigm case of an ‘awkward 
partner’ in the European integration process. And yet, to date the UK has 
never rejected either an EU treaty or EU membership in a referendum. 
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Similarly, it has a reputation as a reliable implementer of EU legislation, with 
a better track record in this regard than most other member states (Armstrong 
and Bulmer 2003).The perception of British ‘awkwardness’ has also persisted 
despite the fact that, in day-to-day EU operations, the UK is often a dextrous 
player of diplomatic games, with officials able to smooth feathers that have 
been ruffled by their political masters (Wall 2008). In what follows we explore 
the material and ideational factors which allowed this diagnosis to arise and 
persist. 
 
Material factors 
Power relations 
 European integration has focused on developing a stronger European 
entity, in order to help erstwhile great powers recover after World War II and 
to help those same powers address the challenges of both the Cold War and 
globalisation. The role of the US in establishing what is now the EU was 
crucial, both in terms of providing material  support through  Marshall Aid 
and by helping create the context in which integration could flourish as part 
of US foreign policy (Lundestad  1986). Indeed, after the Suez crisis British 
policy-makers had to learn quickly that there were limits to their foreign 
policy autonomy, and applied to join the then-European Economic 
Community largely to  ensure Britain did not lose value to the US as a 
security partner and ally (George 1998).  
 
Institutions and policies 
The UK has always been out of step with the European mainstream 
regarding the kind of institutions that are required for the integration process, 
and also on many of the policies it should produce. Britain’s clear preference 
is for free trade, with a reluctance to allow supranational institutions and a 
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broad range of common policies to develop at regional level (Young 1999; 
Carey and Geddes 2010).  
 Moreover, Britain’s failure to join the ECSC (European Coal and Steel 
Community) in 1952, despite the invitation to do so, meant that the EU 
institutions and policies which grew from this root did not reflect British 
preferences (George 1998). Thus, once the UK finally joined the then-
European Economic Community in 1973, it was difficult for UK officials and 
politicians to operate effectively in the EU system: coming from political and 
legal traditions that are still outside the continental mainstream (Armstrong 
and Bulmer 2003), British officials and politicians often found the EU 
processes and institutions frustrating (Wall 2008). The resultant iterated 
attempts to renegotiate the terms of membership and core policy settlements 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) meant that the UK 
demonstrated different policy priorities from those already established, right 
from the outset (Weigall and Stirk 1992). Perhaps the most notorious example 
of British disruptiveness was the row about the contribution to the EU budget 
by the UK. The budget rebate discussions began under the premiership of 
James Callaghan, and were pursued with vigour to their conclusion by his 
successor, Margaret Thatcher (George 1998). 
  
 
Economics 
Economic policy considerations have also been important in shaping 
perceptions of UK awkwardness. As mentioned above, the UK has 
persistently advocated a free-trade, economically (neo-)liberal Europe. This 
advocacy has not been without success – the UK under Thatcher was a key 
contributor to the creation of the Single European Market (Bache and Jordan 
2006a, Wall 2008) – but it has often placed the UK at odds with other member 
states, whose preferences are, or at least have been, for other varieties of 
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capitalism. A key issue here has been the so-called European Social Model, 
about which even Labour governments have been sceptical (Geddes 2002); 
British governments have repeatedly resisted transfer of social policy to the 
EU on grounds of both national sovereignty and ideological difference as, in 
sum, they have favoured a more market-driven approach to employment and 
welfare issues than their continental counterparts.  
  
Security 
Security calculations were certainly part of the UK’s choice to seek 
membership of the then-EEC, but this was a negative choice taken for fear of 
being left behind by a potential US-USSR-Western Europe triangle of Great 
Powers, rather than a step taken out of positive conviction that the integration 
process should produce an independent security capacity (Young 1999). Thus, 
the changed security calculus that emerged after the Suez Crisis was crucial; 
without it, the Foreign Office might never have overcome opposition from the 
Treasury (Weigall and Stirk 1992).  
 However, the security calculation taken in the late 1950s set the tone 
for subsequent British views about the EU’s role in providing security. 
Persistently Atlanticist in its orientation, the UK has continued to promote 
strong ties to NATO and to Washington. Thus, despite its recent and 
acknowledged role as a leader in the development of the European Security 
and Defence Policy, the UK has continued to ensure that this policy keeps the 
EU as part of the Atlantic alliance instead of developing in a more Gaullist 
direction – a further sign of ‘awkwardness’ for some, but not all, of the other 
EU states (Wall 2008).4 
 
Domestic Politics 
The domestic context of British policy towards European integration is 
often held up as a core source of London’s ‘awkwardness’, and also as an 
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explanation for the latter’s persistence. Over time, the UK has become 
thoroughly Europeanised as a polity, in its politics (patterns of interest 
representation, the impact on party politics and political parties), and in many 
of its policies (Bache and Jordan 2006b). There has even been a ‘quiet 
revolution’ in the way that central government works in Britain, deliberately 
undertaken as a means to help the UK shape EU policy more effectively 
(Bulmer and Burch 2006: 37). However, this does not equate to a British 
political context which would be favourable to deeper European integration, 
or in which political leaders consider that it is worth the risk to argue 
persistently in favour of deeper European integration. 
 The first way in which this can be seen is in the impact of public 
opinion. For example, Tony Blair calculated that it was electorally too risky to 
point out the political importance of EU matters to the general public (James 
and Oppermann 2009); this allowed the default popular perception that the 
EU is a persistent but ultimately inconsequential irritant, rather than a matter 
of great importance, to be maintained.5 The consequence was British failure to 
join the Euro, a factor which contributed to Blair’s limits as a potential EU 
leader (Wall 2008).  
 Indeed, a failure to be clear about what was at stake in European 
integration has been a common feature of British politics ever since accession, 
perhaps with the exception of Margaret Thatcher’s premiership (Young 1999). 
Moreover, an emphasis on costs, not benefits, of the EU, came to be a default 
position regarding membership; the construction of the UK as a bulwark 
against otherwise irresistible and rapacious EU forces has been a constant 
feature of British public diplomacy about the EU ever since the accession 
campaign in 1972 (George 1998).  
 The second way in which domestic politics places constraints on UK 
performance in the EU is linked to the internal politics of political parties and 
also to the wishes of powerful non-party actors, such as the popular press. Of 
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course, this is not entirely separate from public opinion, but it is expressed in 
a different way, i.e. institutionally. Divisions within political parties can 
restrict a Prime Minister’s room for manoeuvre. For instance, John Major’s 
difficulties in  maintaining party coherence over the EU issue shaped the UK’s 
negotiating position on the Maastricht Treaty, and meant that the UK had to 
insist on opt-outs from policies such as the single currency and social policy 
(Wall 2008).  The more recent governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown 
shaped their EU policies in order to respond, in part, to pressure from 
newspapers, thereby ensuring that their opponents in Parliament had no 
opportunity to outflank them from a Eurosceptic position (James and 
Oppermann 2009).  
 
Ideational factors 
Identity 
British policy towards European integration has been coloured since 
the outset by narratives of the cultural separateness, difference and even 
superiority that Britons and the UK enjoy vis-à-vis the rest of the continent 
(Weigall and Stirk 1992; Young 1999). Reinforced by political and legal 
traditions which are different from the continental mainstream (Armstrong 
and Bulmer 2003), these perceptions are reflected in popular assumptions that 
the so-called ‘special relationship’ with the US is more important than that 
with the EU, as well as being more culturally appropriate or intuitive (George 
1998: 14- 15); membership of the EU is seen more as a reflection of decline 
than, as in many other member states, a way to ensure peace and prosperity 
(Young 1999). British people, in the main, do not feel European, trust EU 
institutions or consider the EU a worthy subject of electoral interest (Geddes 
2002).6  
 
Vision 
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Related to identity is ‘the vision thing’ – what kind of EU does the UK want, 
and how well does this mesh with the desires of other member states? Except 
in relation to the single market project London has been much better at setting 
out what it does not want than what it actively seeks from and for the EU 
(Armstrong and Bulmer 2003: 389); it has also been consistent in frustrating 
other member states’ projects by developing alternative, minimalist variants 
as counter-proposals - for example, on the debates regarding differentiated 
integration in Europe (George 1998: 259-64). That said, elements of a British 
Euro-vision of a kind can be discerned: an intergovernmental, Atlanticist 
project, open to enlargement: this has not resonated fully with many of the 
original member states, but is more attractive to many of those which joined 
in the 2004-7 accession process. 
 In sum, the UK’s awkwardness can be considered  a mixture of 
material and ideational factors, and also as an ongoing but malleable feature 
of the UK-EU relationship. Britain is not always ‘awkward’, and can, as with 
the single market or ESDP, even be in the EU vanguard, but it is often 
considered to punch below its weight in EU politics. Cause and effect in 
British awkwardness are difficult to disentangle, but perhaps lie above all in a 
sense of cultural, economic and political distinctiveness, and a sense that 
Britain does not really need European integration for anything other than 
trade - expressed in policy terms as Atlanticism and in a preference for 
minimal political integration. We now proceed to discuss Australia’s role 
within its regional integration context. 
 
AWKWARD AUSTRALIA   
 
Unlike the UK, Australia has been a facilitator and a driver of regional 
integration in the Asia Pacific, even playing a key role in moving APEC 
towards a formula for the inclusion of the three Chinese entities (China, 
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Taiwan, and Hong Kong) from 1991. APEC symbolizes Australia's regional 
vision and initiative. Australia has had a reputation as an honest broker, 
bringing together broad coalitions of interests. Australia has promoted peace-
building in the region (e.g. in East Timor and the Solomon Islands) and 
participates actively in the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit.  
Despite Australia’s attempts to punch above its weight and become more 
entrenched in regional forums and trade and investment links, it is not 
regarded as  belonging in the region. Australia is an ‘awkward partner’ in 
Asia Pacific  context, and has experienced the ‘liminality’ of being neither here 
nor there, as somehow being on the margins of the region (Higgott and 
Nossal, 1997).  
 
Material factors 
Power Relations 
Australia’s role in the Asia Pacific is best understood in terms of the 
region’s power politics. The US has played a significant role in influencing 
and even defining the politics of regionalism in Asia (Katzenstein, 2005; 
Higgott, 2007; He, 2011a, 2011b), although American strategic and economic 
objectives  were of a hub-and-spokes kind and based on a reluctance to 
develop either deep regional security architecture or economic regionalism. It 
has thus been the middle powers that have driven regionalization in Asia 
because it enhances their status and influence in the region in relation to 
greater powers – or else because it is part of a vision for reconciliation and 
effective governance. ASEAN is the result of middle power-driven 
regionalization; the force of path-dependence renders ASEAN, in its own 
context, powerful. When Australia’s then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 
proposed an Asia Pacific Community (APC) that effectively sidelined 
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ASEAN, this was resisted by the organization’s members and resulted in few 
concrete achievements (He, 2011a; 2011b; Murray, 2010b). 
East Asians have pursued regionalism under conditions that do not 
undermine US domination:  complementing and not opposing the US 
position. Although ASEAN has not sought to exclude the US from the region, 
it has developed normative and social mechanisms in which the US plays 
follower (and peer among a number of external ‘dialogue partners’) rather 
than leader. This is the case with the ASEAN Regional Forum7 and the East 
Asian Summit8, for example.  
Australian engagement in regionalism has been constrained by its 
position in relation to the region’s great powers – the US and China. As 
current Prime Minister Julia Gillard (2011) phrased it, Australia’s future is 
based on space ‘for a rising China’ and a ‘robust alliance between Australia 
and the United States’. Australian preferences for inclusion of the US in the 
region have nevertheless created a problem in fostering closer relations with 
China. So regional hierarchy and power relations in Asia influence how 
Australia plays a role in the region and explain the way in which the APC 
proposal was received.  
Institutions and policies  
On 4 June 2008, Rudd first presented his APC vision as ‘a regional 
institution which spans the entire Asia–Pacific region …able to engage in the 
full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political 
matters and future challenges related to security’ (Rudd 2008a). He 
specifically included the US, Japan, China, India and Indonesia within his 
definition of the region, but not ASEAN as a regional grouping. The APC’s 
purpose was ‘to encourage the development of a genuine and comprehensive 
sense of community whose habitual operating principle is cooperation’. Rudd 
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later spoke of ASEAN’s role and significant achievement in ‘building a sense 
of regional identity, a sense of community, and a sense of neighbourhood’ 
and he argued that ASEAN’s ‘habits of cooperation’ had crafted ‘a sense of 
genuine community’ (Rudd 2008b). Contributors to that regional discussion 
would include the US, China, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Australia and India. Responding to criticisms following his original speech, 
Rudd explained that the proposed APC was not an economic union, a 
monetary union, a political union, nor a customs union. Yet, the wider region 
needed to learn from ASEAN’s success ‘how to build the institutions, habits 
and practices of cooperation across the policy spectrum’ (Murray, 2010b). The 
focus was on institutions rather than on policies. He presented to Asian 
interlocutors a choice between building a regional architecture by further 
institutionalisation, or passivity (Rudd 2009a). 
This middle power activism has been a hallmark of the Australian Labor 
Party for some decades, evident in the APEC proposals and in engagement 
with regional bodies.  Despite its being an awkward partner for many Asian 
interlocutors in terms of identity, it has attempted to be a driving force in 
regional architecture debates.  
In the process of regional institution building, Australia has had to tackle 
the issue of authoritarian states participating in Asia Pacific regionalism, 
which constrains Canberra’s ability to develop a pragmatic approach towards 
regional development in Asia. On the one hand, Australia cannot allow the 
issue of democracy to hijack efforts to enhance regionalism, but on the other 
hand it cannot get around the issue of democracy and human rights when 
dealing with China. The exclusion of China from any economic regionalism in 
Asia is impossible - and China’s place must be considered in any regional 
architecture. However, region-building will be unsuccessful if China stresses 
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the advantages of its own political system and Australia insists on promoting 
democracy. Here we observe that region-building and institution-building are 
bound up with ideational factors for Australia in its regional context. 
Economics  
Political economy is the foundation of the regionalization process for 
many regions.  The fact that East Asia’s economic engagement with the US is 
deeper than it is within the region itself underlines the Asian tendency 
towards open or porous regionalism. In trade, globalization is the most 
important trend for China and, indeed, all of Asia, while for Europe regional 
integration is more important, with high EU intraregional trade at 
approximately 65% , unlike ASEAN (24%). Asia constitutes an open and 
globalized economy, where Australia regards itself as a key player, as a 
primary products exporter to the region, especially of minerals to China. 
From a political economy perspective it is noteworthy that China’s important 
trading partners are the EU and the US, not the rest of Asia, despite 
burgeoning trade with both Australia and ASEAN. Unlike for Australia, 
contemporary Chinese ideas of regionalism are primarily economy-focussed, 
because economic performance is vital both to its long term strategic 
objectives and to its internal social stability (Wang, 2011).  
Australia finds itself in a distinctive position in the Asia Pacific region. It 
is a part of the English-speaking world and has developed and maintained 
close ties relations with the UK. Yet those ties have diminished since UK 
accession to the EU and its forging of stronger ties within the EU, as Australia 
has become more embedded in trade relations with its Asian neighbours - as 
well as increasingly with the EU and its member states, major trading 
partners along with China, Japan and South Korea. Yet its economic priorities 
are in Asia, a point made repeatedly in Gillard’s speech of September 2011. 
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Security  
While Australia is heavily dependent upon China and other Asian 
countries for trade, it relies on the US as its security guarantor. Australia’s 
position has recently been as framed by some observers as a choice between 
China (its major economic market) and the US (its security provider). 
Although Rudd’s APC proposal comprehends the idea of a security 
community, the more recent Gillard speech recognises that the US and 
Australia are part of a loyal alliance. It seems that China constitutes both a 
challenge and opportunity. Security dilemmas can perpetuate splits in the 
politics of Asian regionalism. Further, close economic relations between 
China and Australia overlap with security concerns, as Australia and the US 
must consider the security implications of China’s growing economic 
influence over Australia and China’s influence on security threats in the 
region, such as the South China Sea. 
 
Domestic Politics 
When in the 1990s, then Prime Minister Paul Keating dubbed Australia an 
‘Asian’ country, emphasizing Australia’s double identities, it also came at a 
cost – there was a  backlash from sections of Australian society to the idea of 
Australia having an Asian identity, as evidenced by the rise of the One Nation 
Party. The idea of an ‘Asianization’ of Australia is considered in government 
circles to be both dangerous and divisive, although it is politically safe to 
emphasize the need for an increase in Asian literacy levels in Australia - and 
to phrase it as a ‘national skill’ issue, not an identity issue (Rudd, 1995). 
Unlike Europeanisation, the term Asianisation does not have common 
acceptance as identity politics or as a political or administrative or policy 
process. Keating lost the argument when he stressed that Australia must 
become a part of Asia. Taking a lesson from Keating, Rudd and Gillard avoid 
the question of Australian identity. 
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Ideational Factors 
Identity 
Most Australians see no need for Australia to change its cultural tradition 
and adopt cultural features common to Asia.  Within Asia, Australia is not 
perceived as an Asian country, but rather as belonging to the English-
speaking world, a middle power player within the global North.  
Some regional countries, then, still regard Australia as an ‘outsider’, for at 
least two reasons - it is not necessarily regarded as Asian, and it is perceived 
as being closely aligned with the US (Murray, 2010b). Some view Australia as 
a potential rival and not an ally. In this regard, as former Indonesian Prime 
Minister Mahathir said, ‘If you want to become Asian, you should say we are 
Asian because we have an Asian culture, an Asian mentality’ (cited in Milner 
1997: 39). While just how many Asian countries and people hold such a view 
needs to be investigated empirically, the question itself underscores the 
importance of the cognitive and normative elements of regionalism. 
 
Vision  
Australia’s regional  vision is  Asia-Pacificism, which acknowledges the 
important role of the US, but avoids the sensitive question of Australia’s 
identity in the region. This awkward situation is characterised by Australia’s 
relationship with the US, despite being geographically part of Asia, and 
inevitably raises the question of how to deal with indigenous ideas of 
Asianism.  
Australia seeks to maintain and build alliances with Asia and America.  
Nevertheless, most Asians implicitly hold a continental notion of regionalism 
despite different versions of Pacificism having been held by many leaders and 
scholars in Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, and Singapore (Hook 1996; 
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Hundt and Kim 2011). For most Asians, notions of an East Asian Community 
are indigenous, emanating from Asia and advocated by Asians. It has 
historical origins and is supported by some contemporary cultural and 
economic dynamism (He 2011b). And Australia is not a natural part of it, 
given its Asia Pacific orientations. 
COMPARISONS AND DISCUSSION. 
It is difficult to separate the material and the ideational aspects of key 
analytical factors when assessing UK and Australian awkwardness in 
regional integration. For instance, material concerns with the use and 
constraints of state power are bound up with norms of sovereignty and 
autonomy. Consequently, our discussion of the seven analytical factors that 
we grouped into ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ clusters in the Introduction, 
intends these categories as heuristically useful if porous devices. Table 1 
summarises the discussion. 
 
---TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE--- 
 
Power Relations  
 
Both the UK and Australia have a special relationship with the US; the  
ideational factors and security concerns differ, yet each regards the US as a 
partner, or, in the case of Australia, as a ‘great and powerful friend’. Each is so 
close to the US that they have been regarded, in the past, as advancing more 
of a US agenda in regional relations than an independent one. Neither is 
accepted as fully part of their region, in part due to these close links with the 
US, and in part due to their pragmatic view of society, governance and 
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regulation.   For the UK, the role of the US in shaping Britain’s participation 
was fundamental. Indeed, Washington essentially saw UK participation in 
European integration as a means to influence that process indirectly, and 
there is evidence that this agenda was not unwelcome in London (Young 
1999). Similarly, the US’ Asia Pacific regionalism policy has largely shaped 
Australia’s role in the region. Australia followed Washington in advocating 
the idea of an Asia Pacific Community rather than an Asian vision of 
regionalism. Australia’s membership of the East Asia Summit is a key to it 
playing a countervailing role against the rise of China on behalf of the US.    
 
 
 
Institutions and Policies 
 
In terms of institutions and policies, the UK has not been a driver of 
integration within the EU.  In comparison, Australia has been a driver of 
regional architecture in the Asia Pacific. The changing relationship between 
the UK and the Commonwealth altered British perceptions of its foreign 
policy choices as well as Australian foreign policy choices and trading 
orientations (Benvenuti, 2008). Indeed, Australia  re-oriented its trade towards 
Asia as early as the 1950s and deepened its economic engagement with the 
Asia Pacific after the British accession to the then-EEC in 1973 (Benvenuti, 
2008; Murray, 2005).  Whilst the British default position has been that of 
Euroscepticism and a perception of the costs of integration, in Australia there 
has been a turn towards Asia especially over the last two decades, based on 
the desire both for market access in Asia and to be an active leader in the 
design of the regional architecture. 
Australia has sought to play an activist role in the region as a past 
founder of APEC, promoter of peace-building in the region (e.g. East Timor 
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and the Solomon Islands) and a major development assistance contributor. It 
is strongly embedded in the region through agreements such as the FTA with 
ASEAN and a committed diplomatic presence. 
London’s insistence upon institutional minimalism has not prevented 
either the deepening of the EU political system or the creation of practices 
such as qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. Indeed, and pace 
the 2011 EU Bill, London has sought rather to secure opt-outs from certain 
institutional and policy changes rather than to oppose them.9 This is a form of 
limited awkwardness – the UK does not take part in policies such as the 
Schengen area of passport-free travel, but did not prevent others from doing 
so. Indeed, at intergovernmental conferences which decide the contents of 
new EU Treaties, other states are just as active as the UK in defending their 
‘red lines’.  
 
Economics 
 
Both Australia and the UK are keen to be entrenched in their region in 
economic terms, in relation to both trade and investment links. Each has 
different perceptions of the benefits and losses associated with membership of 
a regional entity. The benefits of the UK’s EU membership – economic and 
otherwise - are evident in a government report 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/ewt/tenyears.htm).  
However, economic factors have been key drivers of UK awkwardness. 
The UK’s preference for free markets and neoliberalism has historically 
placed it outside the continental mainstream, even if the gap has closed since 
the enlargement of 2004. The UK’s insistence on ‘getting its money back’ 
demonstrated a wish to keep the EU budget to a minimum that continues to 
this day, and the choice to opt-out of the Euro demonstrated a clear 
preference to preserve national sovereignty. 
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The benefits to Australia of a closer regional architecture are primarily 
based on security and trade as priorities. Australia is currently actively 
engaged with the Asia Pacific region in trade and security, and in a deepening 
relationship with the EU. This is an aspect of Australian foreign policy that is 
not mirrored in the UK context. The Asia Europe Meeting, which Australia 
recently joined, provides an opportunity for Australia and the UK to interact 
in a single forum with key partners in each region, and to influence agendas 
and deepen relations with both sets of interlocutors. Yet this engagement is 
not without its challenges. The benefits of Australia’s ASEM membership 
include the development of close relationships with Asian partners and the 
lessening of potential tensions with both EU and Asian partners, whether on 
agriculture with the EU or on the sensitivities of regional architectural design 
with some Asian partners. 
 
Security 
 
Security is related to the power relations discussed above. Australia shares 
common security interests with the US and Europe. Historically Australia first 
relied upon the UK for its security and later looked to the US for protection. 
While the American influence is important and the link between the two 
states is strong, the contemporary history has been counter-balanced by an 
Australian commitment to the Asian region. Australia has signed the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN and has been an active participant in 
the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit. 
Security concerns were a key factor in persuading the UK to apply to 
the then-EEC. Security policy also offers the UK an opportunity to lead the 
EU. This opportunity has to some extent been taken, and while the UK’s 
persistent Atlanticism often frustrates certain EU member state governments, 
it is more in tune with the policies of others.  
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Domestic Politics 
 
Many domestic factors come into play. In Australia the Coalition government 
under Howard and the Labor government under Rudd and Gillard have had 
different preferences towards Asia. The two-party system in Australia has 
impacted on ideational choice. Debates over Australian identity have played a 
part in shaping its approach to ideas of Asian regionalism and these debates 
are largely constrained by political culture and the preference of the majority 
of Australians (He, 2011b). No political party dares to talk about the 
Asianization of Australia nowadays.  
Similarly important regarding UK awkwardness are matters of 
domestic politics. UK leaders and elites tend to present the EU as a matter for 
opposition or victory by restraining their partners far more regularly than 
those of other member states, with particularly clear evidence being the 
reaction to the Maastricht Treaty negotiations (Wall 2008). Public opinion 
remains opposed to deeper UK involvement in the EU, with Euroscepticism 
the default position of many voters. This both reflects and entrenches a 
context in which ‘awkwardness’ is difficult to eschew in domestic politics, 
and also played up in the media. 
 
Identity 
 
Both states are usually considered part of the Anglo-sphere in cultural and 
linguistic terms. This sets them apart from the ‘mainstream’ in their respective 
regions, which generally do not have this cultural and linguistic heritage – 
Ireland and New Zealand notwithstanding.  
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Australia faces a dilemma in developing a fully integrated approach to 
Asian regionalism. As long as it fails to engage Asia in substantive cultural 
terms, it lacks cultural legitimacy for a greater role in Asia. Its political 
legitimacy is not strong, given its different governance norms from those of 
most of its neighbours. If Australia moves away from the West and toward 
Asia, this poses ideational and identity problems – and potentially alienates 
Australians as well as the US. 
 Senses of cultural difference, and even superiority, help drive UK 
awkwardness in the EU. The ‘special relationship’ with the US retains a 
discursive allure that relations with the EU have never had, and a view set out 
in the 1940s, according to which Britain is not only different from, but better 
than, other European countries persists.10 Such a situation reinforces the lack 
of British popular socialisation into the EU; differences in policy preferences 
between the UK and other members states are frequently cast in ‘all-or-
nothing’ terms in public debate; policy differences are quickly constructed in 
much of the media as yet another reason for the UK to leave the EU, or at least 
as evidence of the latter’s essential unacceptability.11  
In addition, there are comparable but very different normative 
elements and tensions between European and East Asian regionalism: the 
EU’s normative foundation is democracy, human rights, individual liberty, 
the reduction of national sovereignty, and the creation of at least partially 
autonomous regional organisations, while the normative foundation of Asian 
regionalism is nationalist doctrine, statist power and Asian culture or values 
(He 2004:107; Murray, 2010b). Nationalism is the driving force behind East 
Asian regionalism and states are generally unwilling to surrender some 
sovereignty to regional organisations in order to make them more effective. 
An East Asian commitment to sovereignty is thus arguably an important 
impediment to the development of an organisation to tackle common 
intraregional issues (He 2004:122). Australia must accept this reality just as the 
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UK has accepted that the EU structure is a useful means to tackle common 
transnational problems and to pursue economic interests. 
CONCLUSION – COMPARING AWKWARD PARTNERS 
Despite significant differences existing between the UK and Australia, 
they are not incomparable “apples and oranges” as far as their participation 
in regional integration is concerned. Rather, they are similar “fruits” growing 
out of the same “tree” of culture and language, compounded by the fact that 
both are involved with regional integration processes that they find 
problematic and in which their partners often find them so. This awkwardness 
is due to certain isolationist experiences, both geographic and historical, and 
to the security relationship with the US. In both the UK and Australia the 
close security relationship with the US, the Anglo-sphere’s cultural traditions 
and identity, and domestic politics all interact and produce the same problem 
of awkwardness in their engagement with regional processes.   
An analysis of awkwardness problems developed by this paper lays 
down the foundation to suggest three hypotheses regarding why certain 
middle-power states find participation in regional integration awkward, 
which future comparative work by both comparative politics and IR scholars 
could helpfully test empirically. We close by stating these.  
Hypothesis 1: Strong security links to an extra-regional power leads 
states into awkwardness in regional integration, since such links both create 
policy dilemmas for the state in question and undermine trust in this state by 
its partners; 
Hypothesis 2: To avoid being considered an ‘awkward partner’ in 
regional integration, states must explicitly align themselves with key norms 
and values of that region; 
Hypothesis 3: Seeking a regional leadership role in institutional or 
policy terms is not sufficient to overcome the label of ‘awkward partner’. 
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Table 1: Comparing British and Australian ‘Awkwardness’12 
 
ISSUE 
 
MATERIAL/ 
IDEATIONAL? 
UK EXPRESSION 
(SALIENCE) 
AUSTRALIA 
EXPRESSION  
(SALIENCE) 
COMPARATIVE 
IMPLICATIONS 
Power 
relations 
Material Reluctant 
membership bid; 
Atlanticism (4) 
Keen 
membership 
bids. Alliance 
with US (5) 
Differ on membership 
perceptions. Alliance with 
US crucial. 
Institutions 
and Policies  
Material Minimalism, 
emphasis on 
economics/trade (5) 
Large emphasis 
on security and 
economics, FTAs 
, Asia Pacific 
institutions (5) 
Economic 
regionalism/integration 
important.  
Economics Material Neoliberalism; 
Budget contribution 
and restrictions; 
Non-participation in 
€-zone (4) 
Neoliberalism. 
FTA with 
ASEAN, possibly 
with China (3) 
Economic benefits of 
regional belonging for both. 
Economic interdependence. 
Security 
 
 
 
Material Atlanticism; catalyst 
in ESDP (3) 
 
US link. Activist 
in security 
forums (3) 
US security support for 
both. Strategic alliances. 
Domestic 
Politics 
Material Popular 
Euroscepticism as 
constraint (5) 
Little sense of 
Asian identity. 
Emphasis on 
economic ties (4) 
Lack of sense of regional 
identity a constraint for UK 
and Australia 
Identity Ideational Sense of cultural 
difference; 
Atlanticism (4) 
Sense of cultural 
difference. US 
link (4) 
Sense of cultural difference 
common to UK and 
Australia.  Identity linked 
to special relationship with 
US. 
Vision Ideational Further Regional Different end goals. 
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enlargement, 
minimalism, inter-
governmentalism (4) 
architecture 
(APC, APEC). 
(4)  
 
Source: Authors. ‘Salience’ here means how important a factor is in shaping the regional 
awkwardness of the UK or Australia. 
 
Word count: 8,381 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 The terminology is of course Stephen George’s (George 1998).George does not define ‘awkwardness’ 
in his book, and, although we follow his lead in this paper by relying on a jargon-free definition, we 
suggest that awkwardness is a mixture of obstructiveness and maladroitness, and of liminality – being 
both of the region, and also not of it, simultaneously. 
2
 For a discussion see Ougaard 2002 and Sørensen 2002. 
3
 The EU, on this typology, is best considered as a region-state; ASEAN could be considered a 
regional community; and APEC fits best with the regional complex category. 
4
 For instance, Germany has often been more Atlanticist than France. Other member states have seen 
UK involvement and policy preferences as helpful to balance French interests. See Parsons 2006, 
Janning 2005. 
5
 In the past, this state of affairs has prevented the EU being considered a significant issue by voters at 
UK general elections; despite widespread popular Euroscepticism, the Conservative Party did not reap 
the rewards of a heavily anti-EU election campaign in 2001 (Geddes 2002). 
6
 Eurobarometer, the EU’s regular opinion survey, shows that fewer UK citizens think the EU is 
beneficial for their member state than those of any other (27%), and also display the highest level of 
distrust of the EU overall (64%). Standard Eurobarometer 74, published February 2011; see 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htm, accessed 28/9/11. 
7
 The ARF consists of the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam); the 10 ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, 
Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia and the United States), one ASEAN 
observer (Papua New Guinea) and the DPRK, Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. 
8
 The EAS consists of the ten ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand 
and the Republic of Korea. The US and Russia will formally join in 2011. 
9
 The EU Bill includes a so-called ‘referendum lock’ on any future EU Treaty change which transfers 
significant powers from the UK to the EU. 
10
 The former Labour Security Minister Lord West caused a furore with his September 2011 remark 
about the UK’s global status that ‘We are not bloody Belgium or Denmark’. See 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15021503, accessed 28/9/11. 
11
 The Daily Express, for example, runs an overt campaign for the UK to leave the EU. 
12
 We rate the salience of each factor on a scale of 1-5, with 1 the lowest and 5 the highest. 
